To solve the problem of group task allocation with time constraints in open and dynamic network environments, this paper proposes a decentralized combinatorial auction-based approach for group task allocation. In the proposed approach, both resource providers and consumers are modeled as intelligent agents. The proposed approach is decentralized, so all the agents are limited to communicating with their neighboring agents. The proposed approach also allows agents to enter and leave the network environments freely, and is robust for the dynamism and openness of the network environments. Tasks in the proposed approach have deadlines, and may need the collaboration of a group of self-interested providers. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach outperforms two well-known task allocation approaches in terms of success rate of task allocation, the individual utility of the agents, the speed of task allocation, and scalability.
INTRODUCTION
Task allocation is an important problem to be solved in many domains such as RoboCup rescue [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] , radar predictions of weather situations [6] , supply chain formation [7, 8] and e-trading 1 . In recent years, with the development of the network, much attention has been paid to task allocation in network environments, in both research [9, 10] and applications [11, 12, 13] . This paper addresses the task allocation in market-based network environments. Task allocation in such environments is an important research problem because it can be used to regulate the resource management and utilization in these environments.
In market-based network environments, there are both resource providers and resource consumers. Resource consumers need the resources of providers to accomplish their tasks, and pay the providers for the resources. If the required resources for a task are distributed over a group of administratively independent providers, the allocation of this task is called group task allocation.
In the group task allocation in market-based network environments, providers collaborate to accomplish a task in order to gain mutual profits.
There are two main challenges for group task allocation in market-based network environments.
1 www.ebay.com First, it is challenging for the consumer to choose a group of providers to accomplish its task when there are multiple provider groups that can finish the task. Second, more and more network environments are becoming open and dynamic, where providers and consumers can enter and leave freely. Consequently, task allocation approaches must be robust for the dynamism and openness of the environments.
A number of group task allocation approaches have been proposed to do this.
These include: combinatorial auction-based approaches [14, 15] , multiresource negotiation-based approaches [16, 17] , and greedy algorithm-based approaches [18] .
Both the combinatorial auction-based approaches proposed in [14] and [15] need a public auctioneer to run the auction for all the consumers, and thus are centralized.
The public auctioneer can cause overloads of both communication and computation. In addition, it is hard for the self-interested bidders to trust the auctioneer, and it is hard for the auctioneer to obtain truthful information from the bidders. The multi-resource negotiation-based approaches proposed in [16] and [17] are decentralized.
In these two approaches, a consumer negotiates with providers for each of the required resources separately. The separate negotiations take a long time to obtain all the required resources, and this is a disadvantage for task allocation when there are time constraints. In the Y. Kong greedy algorithm-based group task allocation approach proposed in [18] , both the consumers and providers are fixed, but do not vary dynamically. Their approach, therefore, cannot deal very well with task allocation in open and dynamic network environments.
With these difficulties in mind, an indicatorbased combinatorial auction-based approach for task allocation (ICAA) is proposed in this paper.
In combinatorial auctions, there are always more than one group formation of bidders that can meet the consumer's resource requirement. To help the consumer pick out the most suitable group, an indicator is devised for each group, and this is why the proposed approach is said to be 'indicator-based'. There is neither a central controller nor a public auctioneer in ICAA, and each consumer plays the role of auctioneer for itself to assemble the resources required by its task.
Each agent in ICAA has a neighborhood and is limited to communicating with its neighboring agents. The absence of a public auctioneer eliminates communication and computation overloads and can improve the consumer's privacy management, because it means that the consumer does not have to expose its private information to a public auctioneer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The motivations and some real world applications of the research in this paper are introduced in Section 2. The task allocation problem is defined formally in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the task allocation approach in detail, and Section 5 evaluates ICAA experimentally. Related work is given in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7.
GROUP TASK ALLOCATION IN THE REAL WORLD
Group task allocation is an important problem in many applications in the real world, such as PlanetLab 2 and GENI (Global Environment for Network Innovations) 3 . PlanetLab supports the development of new network services through pooling together computational resources that can be shared among sites or peers [19] . PlanetLab is critical to the foundation of GENI which is a facility concept being explored by the United States Computing Community with support from the National Science Foundation. The goal of GENI is to enhance experimental research in distributed systems and computer networking and to accelerate the transition of this research into services and products that can improve the economic competitiveness of the United States. GENI assembles resources from a wide range of administratively independent entities, such as research departments, industry and universities. GENI was initially developed as a non-profit platform to allocate research tasks to the assembled resources, and has evolved into a platform in which self-interested resource providers such as Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) 4 and HP cloud 5 and consumers from a wider range join to lease, rent or exchange resources to gain profits ( Figure 1 is a simple illustration of the racks connection of GENI). As a consequence, GENI requires market-oriented group task allocation mechanisms are required. For example, research group A plans to do a large scale research project which requires the following resources: a data center to get raw data, high performance CPU clusters to calculate the raw data, and storage to store the calculation results. A medium to be used for data transmission is also required. Due to the large scale of the research project, the research group logs on to GENI to rent the required resources. We assume that the related resource distribution in GENI is: Amazon EC2 can provide both the storage and CPU services, HP Cloud can contribute both the transmission and storage services, university A can provide both the data center and CPU services, and university B can provide the data center service. Given the resource distribution, there are multiple combinations of resource groups (combinations) which can finish the research project. These resources may be withdrawn, however, and some new unexpected resources may arrive. For example, university A may withdraw its CPU services, and another university may join in with super computers. Tasks are also dynamic. For example, a new task may arrive and take over the resource of the data center of university B. This means that in dynamic and open environments, allocating the research task to resources can be difficult and it is this allocation which is addressed in this paper.
There are many examples in real world applications for the importance of openness and dynamism. For example, Amazon EC2, a virtual computing environment, is a web service which can provide distributed resources to customers. The quantities and types of resources and the applications used in the environment are dynamically configured through a web service [20] . In the IBM Pulse 2014 Conference, IBM senior Vice President Robert LeBlanc said "we'll offer a dynamic cloud environment where all of the technology resources and data assets of an enterprise are readily available, integrated with one another, and deliverable in the way that suits the organization's needs, whether in on-premises systems, or private or public clouds"
6 . In addition, from the security research platform of HP 7 , which aims at helping enterprises guard their enterprises from security threats in the dynamic and open cloud environments with HP Security Intelligence, we can see that dynamism and openness are becoming important characteristics which must be considered.
FIGURE 1. GENI-Racks-Connection
Apart from PlanetLab and GENI which were initially developed for research, much study has been done into group task allocation in e-commerce. In this environment, resource providers provide and withdraw their resources, and tasks appear and expire dynamically and unpredictably over time.
As a consequence, a system where providers can respond to the dynamism quickly and resiliently is required [21] . To solve this problem, a number of projects have been promoted, such as CONOISE-G (ConstraintOriented Negotiation in an Open Information Services Environment (Grid)) [21] , MASSYVE (Multiagent Manufacturing Agile Scheduling Systems for Virtual Enterprises) [22] , and X-CITTIC (a planning and control system for semi-conductor virtual enterprises) [23] .
CONOISE-G provides a model of virtual organizations management which operates in a resilient and agile manner, and focuses particularly on the virtual organization formation. MASSYVE focuses on agile resource scheduling, and X-CITTIC concentrates on planning and controlling in the virtual organization operation process phase. These projects demonstrated the importance of group task allocation in dynamic market-based environments.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we first introduce the characteristics of the task allocation addressed in this paper, then we formally define the main components of the problem.
The group task allocation addressed in this paper has six important characteristics.
1. One type of resource may be provided by multiple providers and required by more than one task simultaneously. 2. All of the required resource types of a task are distributed on multiple administratively independent organizations, such as universities or companies.
3. Both resource providers and consumers are selfinterested and try to maximize their own profits. 4. Old tasks expire and new tasks appear unpredictably over time. Like tasks, resources are dynamic as well, being withdrawn or becoming available unpredictably. 5. Both the consumer and the provider only have a local view. 6. Allocation of a task is under an overall time constraint. "an overall time constraint" means that for the allocation of any individual part of the task, there is no time constraint, but for the allocation of the whole task, there is a time constraint (i.e., the latest start execution time of the task, which will be defined later).
Now we formally define the important components of the problem.
Definition 1 (Task): A task, denoted as τ k , is defined by a 5-tuple (R k , t kgen , d k , t kl , r k ), where R k is the resource set required by τ k , t kgen is the generation time of τ k , d k is the deadline of τ k , t kl is the latest start execution time of τ k , and r k represents the maximal reward that can be obtained by τ k 's owner if τ k is finished successfully.
The allocation of a task is considered successful if and only if the task is successfully allocated before its latest start execution time. The execution of a task will be terminated when the deadline comes, no matter whether the task has been finished or not. The task's owner, i.e., the consumer, can obtain profits from the task only if the task is finished before its deadline.
In this paper, each node in the network environment is modeled as an agent which can make decisions autonomously. When an agent needs other agents' resources to execute its tasks, it is a consumer. When an agent provides its resources to other agents, it is a provider. In this paper, an agent can be a consumer or a provider, or even both. Formally, we have:
is the unique identifier of a i , R i is the resource set that a i possesses, and N eigh i = {a i1 , . . . , a ik } is the neighbor set of a i (k ∈ N is the number of neighbors of a i ). The neighborhood is defined by network connectivity, and two agents are neighbors only when they are immediately connected.
An agent judges whether its neighbors are still active in the environment through heartbeat messages. Assume that a i and a j are neighbors, the heartbeat message sent from a i to a j is, denoted by HeartBeat ij , defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Heartbeat Message): HeartBeat ij is defined by a 2-tuple (ID i , ID j ), where ID i and ID j are the ID numbers of a i and a j , respectively.
An agent keeps sending a heartbeat message to its neighbors once each time unit to inform its neighbors that it is still active in the environment. If agent a i has Y. Kong not received any heartbeat message from its neighbor, a j , in the previous time unit, it considers that a j has left the environment and thus abandons the neighborhood with a j .
Besides the heartbeat message, there are two other types of messages passed between two neighboring agents: the request message and the reply message for executing tasks. We still assume that a i and a j are neighbors. The request message and reply message between them are defined by Definitions 4 and 5, respectively.
The request message sent from a i to a j , denoted by ReqExecute ij , means that a i requests a j to execute a i 's task.
Definition 4 (Request Message): ReqExecute ij is defined by a 4-tuple (ID i , ID j , τ k , HL), where ID i and ID j are the message sender's ID and the message recipient's ID, respectively, τ k is the task that needs to be executed, and HL is a hop limitation (where HL ∈ N and HL ≥ 1) used to prevent the request message from being transmitted endlessly.
The reply message sent from a j to a i , denoted by RepExecute ji , is the message used to reply to the request message ReqExecute ij .
Definition 5 (Reply Message):
RepExecute ji is defined by a 6-tuple (ID j , ID i , t f in , τ k , Set r , pri j ), where ID j and ID i represent the message sender's ID and the recipient's ID, respectively, t f in is the time when a j can finish τ k , Set r is the resource set that a j can provide to τ k , and pri j is the bidding price asked by a j as the payment for Set r .
TASK ALLOCATION APPROACH
In this section, we first explain the reasons for choosing first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction as the basis of ICAA in Section 4.1, then we introduce the task allocation process in Section 4.2. The candidate group formation algorithm and the indicator design are introduced in detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
The Reasons for Choosing First-price Sealed-bid Combinatorial Auction as Basis
The required resources of a task in ICAA are distributed on multiple providers, and combinatorial auction is suitable to assemble the required resources. Conventionally, there is a public auctioneer to run auctions for all the consumers in a combinatorial auction but the public auctioneer is a central controller and there are both computational and economic disadvantages of this.
From the perspective of computation, it becomes computationally intractable for the central controller when more providers and consumers join the auction. From the perspective of economy, it is difficult to find an auctioneer that can be trusted by self-interested bidders in marketbased environments.
Against this, we implement decentralization through assigning the consumer to play the role of the auctioneer for itself, and the consumer obtains bids through its own neighborhood. In order to be robust against the dynamism and openness of the environment, consumers in ICAA take the dynamism and openness of the environment into consideration by encoding them into the indicator (which will be formulated in 4.4) of each candidate group. First-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction (FPS-BA) is adopted as the basis of ICAA but with some modification in that in FPSBA, the standard for choosing the winning bidder is the bidding price, whereas in ICAA, this standard is replaced by a comprehensive one (formulated by Equations (1) and (2)) which takes more factors into account in addition to the bidding price. There are three reasons to adopt first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction (FPSBA) as the basis. First, the winner can verify that the payment it gains is the bid that it made. In contrast, in a second price sealed-bid auction, the winner has to trust the center to fairly compute the payment based on other bidders' bids, which it cannot directly observe. Second, FPSBA is still efficient, even if it is not incentive compatible. Third, each bidder in FPSBA bids only once, and this can save time, which is important for task allocation under time constraints.
The Task Allocation Process
Now we assume that a i is a consumer, when a i has a task τ k to be finished, it sends a request message (see Definition 4) to all of its neighbors. The agent who receives the request message, say a j , checks whether it has some of the required resources. If so, it sends a reply message (see Definition 5) to a i , and the reply message is viewed as the bid made by a j . If not, and if HL in the request message is not 0, a j transmits the request message to its own neighbors. Otherwise, a j abandons the received message. We assume that the transmission of a request message by an intermediate agent is safe for the message. The reason for this is that in real life applications, it is reasonable to assume that a provider is willing to help transmit the message if it does not have any of the required resources. In contrast, if the provider who received the request message has some required resources, it will not transmit the request message to any other providers, in order to reduce the number of its potential competitors. This is why we stipulate that a provider transmits the request message only when it does not have any of the required resources. If a request message is transmitted, it is re-assembled by the intermediate agent who will change some information in the request message before transmitting the message to its own neighbors. In detail, the ID of the old recipient in the request message is replaced with the ID of its new recipient, and HL is reduced by 1. The transmission will not end until HL becomes 0. If a recipient of the request message Task allocation in an open network environment has some or all of the required resources of τ k , but is not the immediate neighbor of a i , it has to construct a neighborhood relationship with a i before sending a reply message straight to a i . The reason for this is the competitiveness in the environment. The reply message of a provider may be secretly modified by other competitor providers. Consequently, the provider will send a reply message straight to the consumer to avoid the transmission of the reply message.
Due to the transmission of the request message, it is possible that consumer a i cannot receive any reply message for a short time after its request message has been sent. Thus, we stipulate that a i will not start group formation until a predefined time point before the latest start time of its task. If a i has not received any reply message when the latest start time of its task arrives, it will give up the task. Otherwise, once a i starts group formation, it will ignore any later arriving reply messages. Group formation, which will be described in detail in Section 4.3, is the process where a i forms candidate groups after obtaining bids through neighborhoods. A candidate group is a group of providers which can collaboratively finish the consumer's task. A candidate group is irreducible, which means that the candidate group cannot finish the task without any provider in the group. Given the candidate groups formed, a i selects the most suitable one.
With the above introduction to the task allocation process in mind, now we go back to the example of task allocation in GENI presented in Section 2 to illustrate the task allocation process. The neighborhood structure of the example is presented in Figure 2 . In Figure 2 , the immediate neighboring agents of research group A include Amazon EC2, HP Cloud, and neighbors A and B. The consumer (i.e., research group A) sends a request message to all of its neighboring agents, and all the recipients of the request message check their own available resources. According to the resource distribution of the four agents in Section 2 (we assume that neighbors A and B do not have any resources required by the consumer), Amazon EC2 and HP Cloud send reply messages (i.e., bids) to the consumer. Amazon EC2 bids to lease both storage and CPU services, and HP Cloud bids to lease both transmission and storage services to the consumer. Neither neighbor A nor neighbor B has any required resources, thus, neighbor A transmits the request message to its own neighboring agent, university A. Neighbor B transmits the request message to its own neighboring agent, university B. After receiving the transmitted request message and checking their own available resources, both universities A and B first construct neighborhoods with the consumer, then university A bids to lease both data center and CPU services, and university B bids to lease data center service. All the eventual bids received by the consumer are presented in Figure 3 . According to the bids, there Table  1 . Next we explain how the consumer selects the most suitable of the eight candidate groups.
Generally, provided that consumer a i obtained in total k candidate groups, these are denoted by gro 1 , gro 2 , ..., gro k . The indicators of these groups are indic 1 , indic 2 , ..., indic k (the indicator design will be introduced in detail in Section 4.4), and the prices asked by these groups are pri 1 , pri 2 , ..., pri k (asking prices of providers will be studied later). We stipulate that the winning group is the one which has the smallest pri/indic ratio. Accordingly, if
and
where
, then gro j is the winning group. From Equations (1) and (2), the winning group is chosen from an economic perspective because the asking price pri i of group gro i is taken into consideration by the consumer. Indicator indic i in Equation (2) is designed from an economic perspective as well, and the reasons will be analyzed when the indicator design is introduced in Section 4.4. When there is more than one group that can meet Equation (1) and Equation (2) simultaneously, a i picks out the Y. Kong winner randomly. The reason for deciding the winning group using Equation (1) and Equation (2) will be seen in Section 4.4. Due to the competitiveness in the environment and selfishness of bidders, bidders do not always truthfully bid the costs of their resources. Instead, they tend to bid higher prices than the actual costs to gain more profits. Generally, multiple factors are taken into account by bidders. These include the popularity of the resource, the truthful cost of the resource, and the composition of the bundle of resources that the provider bids for. In detail, the more popular the resource is, the higher the bidding is; the more the resource costs, the higher the bidding is; the more resources in the bundle of resources that the provider bids to lease, the lower the individual bidding for each of the resources in the bundle.
Based on the analysis above, now we formally formulate the providers' bidding strategy. We assume that a i and a j are the consumer and the provider, respectively, and a j bids to lease a bundle of resources to a i . If r is one of the resources in the bundle, n is the total number of resources in the bundle, and c(r) is the cost of r, n req is the total number of requests for r that a j received from consumers, then the bidding of a j for resource r (denoted by bid(r)) is formulated by:
In Equation (3), log 2 (n req +1) is adopted to weaken the effect of n req to bid(r) which will easily be dominating otherwise. In order to make the bidding higher than the truthful cost,
is adopted, bid(r) = c(r) when n req = 1. It is notable that in Equation (3), n req ≥ 1 in that once the provider calculates the bidding using Equation (3), it represents that the provider has received at least one request for resource r.
The winning group will sign a contract with the consumer. The contract between consumer a i and provider group gro (where gro contains n providers, i.e., gro = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n }), denoted as c(a i , gro), is defined by Definition 6.
where rew is the reward that a i can gain if τ k can be finished at time t f in , t f in is the time when τ k can be completed by gro (t f in will be particularly formulated in Section 4.4.1), and pri 1 , pri 2 , ..., pri n are the prices which will be paid by a i to a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n , respectively, if τ k can be finished at time t f in .
In order to make the task allocation process clear, the task allocation process of ICAA is presented by Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, consumer a i has a task τ k to be executed, and has n neighbors which are denoted by a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n .
The Group Formation
Provided that P is the set of all bidders that bid for the resources required by a i 's task τ k , r ∈ R k , and the number of bidders that bid for r is n r p , there are four steps for a i to form all the candidate groups, which is presented in Algorithm 2.
* Step 1 (Lines 1-14 of Algorithm 2): Pick out resource r, where r = arg min r∈R k (n r p ). * Step 2 (Lines 15-19): Pick out the bidders set P r in which every bidder bids for r, that is, if the provider in P r at index k is denoted by
through recursively calling Steps 1, 2 and 3. We do the same to each
Step 4 (Lines 25-31): Suppose that from steps 1, 2 and 3, a i can obtain n candidate groups for τ k in total, and we use C k to denote the set of the candidate groups. We denote the element of
An example is given to demonstrate the group formation process to make it more clear. We assume that the resource types required by task τ k is R k = {1, 2, 3, 5}. There are seven bidders, say A, B, C, D, E, F and G. The resource sets bided by the bidders are {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}, {3, 5}, {1, 5}, {3} and {2, 3, 5}, respectively. The candidate group formation process is as follows.
*
Step 1: Resource type 1 is chosen because it has the fewest bidders, i.e., bidders A, C and E. * Step 2: Because A, C and E can provide resource type 1, they are chosen. * Step 3: We fix provider A, then the groups that can meet the resource requirement of τ k with A include: ABC, ABE, ACF, AEF, AD and AG. In the same way, we can obtain the groups with C: BC, CD, CF and CG. The groups with E include: BE, EG, ADE, AEF, CDE, and CFE. * Step 4: Delete the groups of ABC, ABE, ACF, AED, CDE and CEF, because BC ⊂ ABC and BE ⊂ ABE, CF ⊂ ACF, AD ⊂ ADE, CD ⊂ CDE and CF ⊂ CEF. Then the eventually obtained candidate groups include AEF, AD, AG, BC, CD, CF, CG, BE and EG.
Time complexity is important to group formation in combinatorial auctions, especially when there are time When aj receives the request message from ai, it checks whether Rj
aj sends a reply message (see Definition 5) back to ai; 5 else if HL ̸ = 0 6 aj transmits the request message to its neighbors; 7 else aj gives the request message up; 8 end if 9 end for 10 group formation; 11 ai picks out the winning group according to Equation (1) and Equation (2); 12 if there is more than one group which have the same value of pri/indic then 13 ai picks out the winning group randomly among these groups; 14 end if 15 ai signs a contract with the winning group.
Algorithm 2: Group Formation (pick out all the candidate groups)
Step 1 : Pick out the resource type which has the fewest bidders;
end if 7 end for 8 end for 9 n = N [0];
end if 14 end for
Step 2 : Insert every bidder that bids for r into a queue Pr;
into Pr 18 end if 19end for
Step 3 : Recursive calling; 20for i = 0 to (|Pr|-1) do 21 pick out the group P r [i] which can meet the resource requirement of
by recursively calling the first three steps of this 23 algorithm, so that P r [i] ∪ Pr [i] can meet the resource requirement of τ k and is irreducible 24end for
Step 4 : Deal with the eventually obtained candidate groups; constraints. We therefore analyze the time complexity of the coalition formation process, i.e., Algorithm 2. Firstly, the four steps of Algorithm 2 are analyzed separately.
|R k | and |P | by m and n respectively, thus, the
Step 3 is a loop, and the loop body is a recursion. If we denote the time complexity of the loop body by T (R m ) (m is the number Y. Kong of the required resource types of τ k ), then the time complexity of step 3 is:
. Thus, the time complexity of step 3 is:
According to the above analysis, we can get the time complexity of Algorithm 2 denoted by T (Al 2 ):
The Indicator Design
In this section, we first introduce the factors that are taken into account by the indicator in order to make ICAA robust to the dynamism and openness of the network environment, then the indicator is formulated accordingly.
The Factors of the Indicator Design
In addition to the price asked by a candidate group, the consumer takes four other factors into account when choosing the winning group in ICAA. The four factors are: (i) the probability of no decommitment in a group, (ii) the number of overlapping resource types in a group, (iii) the reputation of a group and (iv) the reward that can be gained by the consumer from a group.
(i) Probability of no decommitment
In ICAA, a provider is allowed to deviate from an existing group to join another more profitable one, that is, decommitment is allowed. Consequently, a formed group is unstable due to the possible deviations of committed providers.
The external offers and opportunities that may provide incentives to providers to deviate from commitments are studied in other research (e.g., [24] ), but these are not the research focus of this paper. Because a candidate group in ICAA is irreducible, the decomittment of any provider in the group will cause the risk of the failure of the task. As a consequence, the probability of no decommitment of a candidate group should be considered. To do this, a decommitment model is devised to help the consumer predict the probability of no decommitment in a candidate group.
We assume that different providers have different probabilities to decommit from a contract, and the decommitments of providers are independent, that is, a provider's decommitment is an independent decision, not affected by other providers in the same group. The consumer anticipates the probability that a provider will not decommit from it according to the trade history with this provider. Suppose that consumer a i and provider a j have already traded with each other for k 1 (k 1 ∈ N) times, and a j decomitted with a i for k 2 (k 2 ∈ N) times in total. Normally, if the frequency with which decommitment has happened before is k 2 /k 1 , then the most likely future probability of decommitment is k 2 /k 1 as well. Consequently, the most likely probability of no decommitment of a j in the future is (
, is adopted to formulate the probability distribution of no decommitment. Accordingly, the two shape parameters of the beta distribution, α and β, are set k 1 − k 2 + 1 and k 2 + 1, respectively. Therefore, if the distribution of no decommitment probability is denoted
There are two reasons for us to adopt a Beta distribution to formulate p nodec . First, Beta distribution can be updated as more experience is gained, that is, the values of α and β can be updated with the changing of k 1 and k 2 . Second, by moderating over the resulting distribution, the issue of 0 probability can be avoided. The issue of 0 probability must be avoided, and the reason for this will be given later in Equation (4). Now we assume that consumer a i has already signed a contract with group gro (gro = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n }), the probabilities of these n providers not to decommit from
respectively. Due to the independence of these probabilities, according to the multiplication principle, the probability that no provider in gro will decommit from a i (denoted by P nodec (gro)) is:
From Equation (4), being equal to 0 of any p nodec (j) will result in that P nodec (gro) is 0, therefore, being equal to 0 of any p nodec (j) have to be avoided.
(ii) Number of overlapping resource types in a group
There might be overlapping resources among the resources provided by all the providers in a group. Suppose that a provider group consists of two providers, denoted by gro = {a 1 , a 2 }, the resource types set that a 1 can provide is Set 1 = {1, 2, 3}, and that of a 2 is Set 2 = {3, 4, 5}. Apparently, there is one overlapping resource type, i.e., resource type '3'.
Generally, provided that there are n providers in gro, denoted by gro = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n }, the way we calculate the number of the overlapping resource types in gro is: we first calculate the number of the overlapping resource types between a 1 and a 2 , then we treat a 1 and a 2 as one entirety, say, a 12 . The same method is used to calculate the number of overlapping resource types between a 12 and a 3 , and so on until all the providers in gro have been involved into the calculation. The eventually accumulated number of overlapping resource types is treated as the number of overlapping resource types in gro.
If a resource type can be provided by more than one provider in a group, and the resource from one provider will be enough, this resource from other providers will not be needed. In ICAA, a provider is allowed to join more than one group simultaneously to avoid the waste of the extra resources. However, after contributing one part of the resources to one consumer, the extra resources always include only a few resource types. The fewer resource types each provider can averagely provide in a group, the more providers the group includes. From step 4 of the group formation algorithm, we know that formally speaking, the more providers in a group, the higher the decommitment probability of this group is. Consequently, the consumer prefers the provider who can provide more resource types to that provides fewer resource types. Therefore, even though the provider is allowed to join more than one group, its probability of being selected by other consumers is quite small. According to the win-win?rule in economy, the desirable behavior of the consumer should be reducing overlapping resource types as much as possible when its own profit will not be affected. For this reason, fewer overlapping resources in a group is preferred by a consumer.
(iii)Reputation of a group
The QoS (Quality of Service) of providers may be different, so it is important for consumers to take the potential QoS of providers into account when choosing the winning group. To address this concern, consumers anticipate the potential QoS of providers according to the providers' QoS in the past. A consumer can evaluate the QoS of a provider according to different criteria. For example, if tasks are time-sensitive, the QoS of a provider could be evaluated according to whether the provider finished tasks before the task deadlines in the past services.
Based on the trust model proposed by Yu and Singh in [25] , a general method is proposed to help consumers formulate providers' reputations in terms of QoS. Assume that consumer a m wants to anticipate the reputation of provider a n , and a m has already got k (k ≥ 1) services delivered by a n , which are denoted by S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s k }. Provided that r 1 , r 2 , . .., r k r i ∈ (0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) are the respective reputation values of s 1 , s 2 , ..., s k , a low threshold ω (0 < ω < 1) and an upper one Ω (0 < ω < Ω < 1) are defined to classify the reputation values. In detail, S(T ) = {s i |Ω ≤ r i ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ k} denotes the support set of trust, and S(¬T ) = {s j |0 ≤ r j ≤ ω, 1 ≤ j ≤ k} denotes the support set of distrust. When k ≥ 1, the reputation of a n , denoted by r an , is formulated by:
From Equation (5), we know that 1 e ≤ r an ≤ e. The reason to formulate r an by an exponential function is to guarantee that the higher |S(T )| − |S(¬T )| is, the higher r an is.
When k = 0, that is, a m has never got service from a n , r an is set (e + 1 e )/2. It is reasonable to do this because (e + 1 e )/2 is the median between 1 e and e. In summary, the reputation of a n for a m is formulated as:
Now we formulate the reputation of a provider group. Assume that the reputations of the n providers in gro = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n } are r a1 , r a2 , . .., and r an , respectively, if r min = min{r a1 , r a2 , ..., r an }, and r max = max{r a1 , r a2 , ..., r an }, the reputation of gro is formulated as:
The reason to subtract r max and r min when n ≥ 3 is to avoid the strong impacts of the maximal and minimal reputations on gro.
(iv)Reward gained by a consumer
In market-based environments, the reward that a consumer can gain from its task is one of the critical factors to be considered and thus is encoded into indicator design as well in ICAA. Apparently, when a task is executed by a provider group, the whole task cannot be finished until every provider in the group finishes its own part.
Formally, if there are k providers in group gro, and the respective times when the k providers can finish their own parts of τ k are t f in1 , t f in2 , ..., and t f ink , respectively, then the time when τ k can be finished is: t f in = max{t f in1 , t f in2 , ..., t f ink }. In ICAA, tasks are timedependent, which means that the reward that can be gained by a consumer is closely related to the finishing time of its task. Time-dependency is common and normal for both rewards and penalties (which will be particularly defined in Section 5.2.2) in market-based environments.
A piecewise function is adopted to represent the relationship between the finishing time of τ k and the reward that τ k 's owner can gain. If the finishing time of τ k is t, without loss of generality, the reward that τ k 's owner can gain, denoted by rew k (t), is formulated by:
where r k is the maximal reward that task τ k 's owner can gain when τ k is finished, t kgen and d k are the generation time and the deadline of τ k , respectively (see Definition 1), and t 1 , ..., t i , ..., t n (t kgen <t 1 <...<t i . .. <t n <d k ) are different time points.
Apparently, Equation (8) can reflect the timedependency of tasks in that the later τ k is finished, the less reward can be gained by τ k 's owner.
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Formulation of the Indicator
In order to encode the four factors analyzed above into the indicator, the simple multi-attribute rating technique (SMART), which is based on a linear additive model, is employed to devise the indicator. Based on SMART, a comprehensive score, which is the summation of the performance scores of all the attributes multiplied by the corresponding weights of the attributes, is used to rate all the candidate providers. For more details about SMART, refer to [26, 27] .
Formally, provided that gro is one of the candidate groups for task τ k of a i , a i assigns equal importance to all the four attributes. For simplicity, the weights of the four attributes are all set 1. The indicator of gro, denoted by indic gro , is formulated by: (9) where N o.r is the accumulated number of overlapping resource types in gro, the probability that no provider in gro will decommit from a i is P gro , the time when gro can finish τ k is t f in , rew k (t f in ) is the reward that a i can gain if τ k is finished at time t f in , r is the maximal reward that a i can gain when τ k is finished, and the reputation of gro is r gro .
Because 0 ≤ rew(t f in )/r ≤ 1, 1/e ≤ r gro ≤ e, 0 ≤ P gro ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ N o.r ≤ ∞, it is apparent that even the very weak fluctuation of N o.r will influence the value of indic gro strongly. In order to avoid such a strong impact of N o.r, we restrain the impact of N o.r through introducing the logarithmic function of "log 2 " into Equation (9) . In addition, in order to avoid "1/log 2 0" and "1/log 2 1" when N o.r is equal to 0 and 1, respectively, '1/log 2 (N o.r + 2)" instead of "1/log 2 (N o.r)" is adopted.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of ICAA experimentally. The experimental benchmarks are introduced in Section 5.1, and the experimental criteria are given in Section 5.2. The experimental settings are explained in Section 5.3, and the experimental results are presented and analyzed in Section 5.4.
Experimental Benchmarks
Manisterski et al. have proved that in general, no approach that can achieve an optimal solution of task allocation exists if the agents are self-interested [28] , and if such approaches cold exist, they would inevitably be setting-specific. Due to the absence of optimal approaches, two well-known approaches recently proposed are chosen as benchmarks. One is the multi-resource negotiation-based (MRN) task allocation approach proposed by An et al. [16] , and the other one is the Combinatorial Auction-Linear Programming-based approach (CA-LP) proposed in [29] .
In MRN, the consumer obtains its required resources through negotiating with providers separately for each of the required resources. Only when all the negotiation threads for all the required resources succeed, can the allocation of the task be considered as successful. CA-LP is a combinatorial auction-based approach and the consumer acquires resources through placing sealed bids for resources to resource providers. After collecting bids, the provider determines the winning consumers by linear programming. In order to increase the chance of obtaining all of the required resources, the consumer is allowed to bid more than once, but is limited to bidding for a partial set of the required resources from only one provider each time. The consumer has two ways to increase the chance of winning each single bid. One is decreasing the bided resources, and the other one is increasing the quote for the bided resources. The consumer can benefit from a single bid only when all required resources in the bid are obtained. Therefore, each single bid in CA-LP is allor-nothing, and thus considered single-minded and not flexible enough [29] . In addition, if the follow-up bids fail, the already successful bids will become useless, and this is another disadvantage of CA-LP. In addition, the decision on the winner in CA-LP only takes the bidding price into account, while ignoring other factors (e.g., the task deadline, the dynamism of the environment). This limits the robustness of CA-LP against the time constraints of task allocation and the dynamism of the environments.
Experimental Criteria
One of the main purposes of task allocation approaches in network environments is to successfully allocate as many tasks as possible [8] . In addition, the utility of the agent involved is also an important criterion [2] . Because the agents in ICAA are selfinterested, it is the individual utility which agents care about. There are too many agents and it is impossible to show the utility of every agent. We therefore report the utility distributions of agents. Task allocation speed is also important when there are time constraints. For these reasons, we experimentally test three criteria: the success rate of task allocation, the total time used for task allocation and the utility distribution of agents involved in task allocation (the utility of an agent will be formulated next).
Formulation of Utility
(1) The utility gained by agent a i from task τ k is formulated by:
where rew ik is the reward that a i can gain when τ k is finished, and cost ik is the cost of a i to finish τ k . rew ik and cost ik are specified in two cases: (i) if a i is the consumer (i.e., the owner of τ k ), cost ik is the price a i is charged by the provider group which finished τ k .
(ii) if a i is a provider in the provider group which finished τ k , then:
where costres ik is the cost of a i 's resources to finish τ k , and pel ik is the penalty (which will be formulated in Section 5.2.2) that a i is charged by other consumers from which a i has decommitted in order to execute τ k (if decommitments happened).
(2) The utility that provider group gro gains from τ k is:
where n is the number of providers in gro, and uti ik is the utility gained by provider a i from τ k .
Formulations of Penalty
A provider's decommitment from a contract will incur at least one victim agent that encounters the risk of loss of reward. For example, when provider a j decommits from a contract with consumer a i , a i risks not being able to find another provider to replace a j before the latest start time of its task. In addition, the providers in the same group with a j (if there are any) encounter the risk of gaining no reward due to the failure of the task caused by the decommitment of a j . a i and the other providers in the same provider group are considered to be victim agents. In order to mitigate decommitment, penalties are charged to providers that initiate the decommitments in ICAA.
Provided that the contract between consumer a i and provider group gro is con (a i , gro, τ k , rew, t f in , pri 1 , pri 2 , ..., pri n ) (see Definition 6 for the definition of contract), a p and a q are two of the providers in gro (1 ≤ p ≤ n, 1 ≤ q ≤ n, and p ̸ = q), if a p decommits from con, then (1) the penalty that a p has to pay to a i is formulated by:
(2) the penalty that a p has to pay to a q is formulated as:
where 0<β<1. In order to reflect the time-sensitivity characteristic of tasks, we formulate β like:
where t is the time when the decommitment happens, t kgen and t kl are the generation time and latest start execution time of τ k , respectively.
Intuitively, Equations (13), (14) and (15) represent the fact that the later a provider decommits, the more penalties it must pay to the corresponding victim agents.
Experimental Settings
The most reliable way to evaluate task allocation approaches would be to perform real experimentation. However, three reasons prevented us from doing so. First, our research is still in the theoretical phase, focusing on theoretical research and analysis. The proposed approach needs to be improved before being used in real applications. Second, because the task allocation addressed in this paper is closely related to economy, before the research is proven to be totally mature, it is hard to persuade self-interested real resource providers and consumers to participate in the experiments. Finally, due to the dynamism and openness of the network environment, the experimental results are not repeatable [30] . As a consequence, we resort to simulation to evaluate ICAA using C++.
Because ICAA is devised to work in dynamic and open environments, such an environment is necessary in the simulation. In addition, each agent is limited to communicating with its neighbors to obtain a local view. In order to level the playing field, it is necessary to study whether it is fair to test the two benchmarks (i.e., MRN and CA-LP introduced in Section 5.1) in such an environment. From [16] and [29] , both MRN and CA-LP were devised for dynamic environments as well. Additionally, these two approaches do not limit the way the consumer obtains information about the environment. Consequently, the simulation environment designed for ICAA suits both MRN and CA-LP. For this reason, we test the three approaches in such an environment.
In detail, in the simulation, a controller is employed to generate 100 agents and 300 tasks which are inactive in advance of running the experiment. After starting to run the experiment, some or all of the 100 agents and 300 tasks will be activated according to specific requirements. Therefore, the sample sizes of agents and tasks are not fixed but decided by specific requirements, and the biggest sample sizes of agents and tasks are 100 and 300, respectively. An agent constructs a neighborhood with each of the other agents at a predefined probability, say P con (P con ∈ (0, 1]). As a consequence, the network could be formed, where each agent has 100 × P con neighbors averagely. In the simulation, P con is set 0.1 in that it is normal for an agent to have about 10 neighbors. A boolean variable is defined for each agent to represent the agent's states, which include both active and inactive that are represented by 1 and 0, respectively. When the boolean variable is 1, it represents that the agent is in the environment, not in the environment otherwise. In addition, an agent's entering and leaving Y. Kong the environment can be simulated through changing the boolean variable. In detail, when the boolean variable of an agent becomes 0 from 1, it represents that the agent leaves the environment, and it represents the agents enters the environment if the boolean variable becomes 1 from 0. The number of agents in the environment could be controlled through adjusting the probabilities of activating and deactivating agents in each time unit. For example, in order to meet the requirement that 0 to 100 agents are in the environment, 50 agents are set inactive and the other 50 ones are set active in advance. After the start of experiment, the probabilities of each inactive agent's being activated and active agent's being deactivated are both set 0.5. Consequently, the total number of agents in the environment remains 0 to 100, concentrating on 50 − 50 × 0.5 + 50 × 0.5 = 50. Like agent, each task is assigned to a boolean variable as well. When the boolean variable of a task is 1, it represents that the task is in the environment, and not in the environment otherwise. Each task in the environment will be assigned to a randomly chosen active agent which consequently becomes the consumer (owner) of the task and responsible for allocating the task. A consumer cannot leave the environment before successfully allocating its task. With indicators, both the numbers of agents and tasks in the environment could be controlled, and thus the resource competition level which will be defined in Equation (17) . In addition, the dynamism and openness of the environment could be simulated through activating and deactivating agents and tasks.
The required resource types of a task are complementary, and this means that a task can be accomplished only if all of its required resource types are obtained. Therefore, the number of the required resource types per task plays an important role in the performance of ICAA. In addition, allocating as many tasks as possible under time constraints is one of the objectives of ICAA, and thus, the task deadline is also one of the key factors in the performance of ICAA. Additionally, in I-CAA the environment is competitive and the agents are self-interested, therefore the level of resource competition is important to the performance of ICAA as well. Moreover, scalability is also important to a task allocation approach. For the above reasons, the experiment is conducted based on four scenarios: (1) examination of the impact of the average number of required resource types per task, (2) examination of the impact of the latest start execution time of tasks, (3) examination of the impact of the degree of resource competition, and (4) examination of scalability.
Scenario 1: examination of the impact of the number of required resource types per task
In Scenario 1, we test the impact of the number of required resource types per task on the three criteria Table  2 .
In Table 2 , the number of resource types provided by a provider (denoted by N pro ) is between 1 and 10. The reason for choosing this is that in real world applications, it is common and reasonable for a provider to provide from 1 to 10 types of resources. Because N pro is discrete, a Random Number Generator (RNG) was employed to generate values in [1, 10] for N pro . Therefore, N pro obeys uniform distribution over [1, 10] . 50 of the 100 agents are set active and the other 50 ones are set inactive before the start of experiment, after the start of experiment, both the probability of each active agents being deactivated and that of each inactive agent being activated are set 0.5. As a consequence, the number of agents in the environment keeps in [0, 100], concentrating on 50−50×0.5+50×0.5 = 50. Similarly, 150 of the 300 tasks are set active, and the other 150 are set inactive. After the start of experiment, each active task has a probability of 0.5 to be deactivated, and each inactive task has a probability of 0.5 to be activated. Consequently, the number of tasks in the environment keeps from 0 to 300, concentrating on 150.
The allocation flexibility, denoted by f lex, represents the available time to allocate a task before the task's latest start execution time. If t kl is the latest start execution time of task τ k , and t is the current time, then the allocation flexibility of τ k is formulated by:
Because this scenario is to test performances with various N req , in order to avoid the strong impact of f lex(t) on the experimental results, a modest range [20, 50] 
(s) is chosen for f lex(t).
In order to obtain a group of continuous values from 20 to 50 for f lex, a normal distribution generator f lex(t) ∼ (µ, σ 2 ) was employed. The mean number and standard derivation of the normal distribution are set 35 and 5, respectively (i.e., µ = 35, σ = 5), and the reason for this is like the following. In normal distribution, P {µ − 3 × σ ≤ x ≤ µ+3×σ} ≈ 0.997 (P {m ≤ x ≤ n} is the probability of x falling into the range of [m, n]). If we set µ−3×σ = 20, µ + 3 × σ = 50 (i.e., µ = 35, σ = 5), it can guarantee that around 99.7% of the generated values fall into the interval of [20, 50] .
ψ(r) is used to denote the resource competition in the environment, and is defined as: (17) where N t and N a are the numbers of tasks and agents in the network environment, respectively. From Table 2 , we can see that in order to reflect the dynamism and openness of the network environment, a specific value is not set for any parameter. Instead, each parameter is set a range from which the parameter takes different values randomly at different times during the course of the experiment.
1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 are assigned to N req separately to test the performances. The reason to choose these six values for N req is that in real world applications, it is reasonable for a task to require such numbers of resource types.
Scenario 2: examination of the impact of allocation flexibility
In Scenario 2, we test the impact of allocation flexibility which is formulated by Equation (16) on the three criteria. The parameter settings for Scenario 2 are listed in Table 3 . Like Scenario 1, a range of values are assigned to each parameter in this scenario. It is common and reasonable for a task to require from 1 to 10 resource types in real world applications, therefore, N req varies over the interval of [1, 10] in the evaluation. A Random Number Generator (RNG) was employed to generate values for both N pro and N req . The generation is the same as that in Scenario 1. Six normal distribution generators were employed to obtain six groups of values for f lex(t). The six value ranges are [1, 10) , [10, 20) , . . ., and [50, 60). The corresponding normal distribution parameters for these groups are f lex(t) ∼ (5, 1.67
2 ), and f lex(t) ∼ (55, 1.67
2 ), respectively.
Scenario 3: examination of the impact of resource competition
In Scenario 3, the impact of resource competition on the three criteria is tested. The parameter settings for Scenario 3 are listed in Table 4 . Like Scenario 2, a RNG was used to generate values from 1 to 10 for both N pro and N req , and a normal distribution generator, f lex(t) ∼ (35, 5 2 ), was adopted to generate values for 
Variables meanings values
Nreq the number of resource types required by each task [1, 10] Npro the number of resource types provided by each provider [1, 10] f lex(t) the allocation flexibilities of tasks [20, 50] f lex(t) whose range is consequently [20, 50] . The reason to assign [20, 50] to f lex(t) is the same as that of Scenario 1. In this scenario, the impact of ψ(r) is tested, and the various values of ψ(r) were obtained through changing both N a and N t . All the agents and tasks are set inactive before the start of the experiment. After the start of experiment, agents and tasks are activated at various probabilities in each time unit to obtain various resource competition levels. For example, if agents and tasks are activated at probabilities of 0.75 and 0.25, respectively, the numbers of active agents and tasks in the environment remain around 100 × 0.75 = 75 and 300 × 0.25=75, respectively, and the consequent ψ(r) remains around 1. If the probabilities to activate agents and tasks are denoted as P a and P t , respectively, the consequent ψ(r) are listed in Table 5 . It should be noted that the values of both P a and P t in Table 5 are not the only choices, other values also work as long as they can meet the requirement of resource competition levels.
Scenario 4: examination of scalability
In this scenario, we test the scalability of ICAA through testing the performances with various numbers of involved agents and tasks. The parameter settings for this scenario are listed in Table 6 . In Table 6 , both N pro and N req are from 1 to 10, and f lex(t) is in the interval of [20, 50] . The reasons for such parameter settings are the same as those of Scenario 3. The reason to set ψ(r) 2 is that 2 is a modest value which will not bias the examination of scalability. Like Scenario 3, all the agents and tasks are set inactive before the start of the experiment, and are activated at the respective probabilities of P a and P t after the start of experiment. The settings of P a , P t and the consequent N a , N t and ψ(r) are listed in Table 7 . We should note that like Table 5 in Scenario 3, the values of both P a and P t in Table 7 are not the only choices, other values also work Y. Kong as long as they can meet the requirements of both N a and N t .
Experimental Results and Analysis
Experimental Results and Analysis of Scenario 1
Figure 4 (a) shows the impact of N req on the success rate of task allocation. From Figure 4 (a), it can be seen that when N req varies over the range of [1, 10] , ICAA always achieves higher success rates than both MRN and CA-LP. The reason is that the consumer in MRN negotiates with providers for each of the required resource types separately. The separate negotiations always make the consumers only obtain a partial set of the required resources due to the failure of even only one negotiation thread. In addition, the consumer in MRN does not take into account the potential decommitment probabilities of providers when negotiating with the providers. This can result in a high decommitment probability of the commited providers, which results in a high probability of task failure. The all-or-nothing bid of CA-LP makes it hard for the bidders to get all of the required resource types, especially when the resources are scarce. Moreover, the auctioneer in CA-LP does not consider task deadlines when determining the winning bidders, and this further hinders the success of task allocation in CA-LP.
It also can be observed from Figure 4 (a) that when N req is lower than 6, the success rate of MRN is lower than that of CA-LP. This is because when N req is quite small, the disadvantage of bidding a bundle of resources from only one provider each time is not very obvious. With the increase of N req , it gets harder for the consumer in CA-LP to successfully obtain the required resources from only one provider. However, even though the decommitment probability of separate negotiation in MRN is high, the consumer still has the chance to find a replacement for the decommited provider when decommitment happens. As a consequence, when N req is lower than 6, the success rate of task allocation of MRN is lower than that of CA-LP, and the result is the opposite when N req is higher than 6. Figure 4 (b) shows the time used for task allocation based on different values of N req . It can be seen from Figure 4 (b) that when N req varies from 1 to 10, the time used for task allocation in ICAA is shorter than those in both MRN and CA-LP. This is because the singlemind of the combinatorial auction of CA-LP makes it take long to successfully obtain all of the required resource types. In MRN, the consumer can negotiate with resource providers for all the required resources simultaneously, and this can save time to obtain all of the required resource types. The consumer in ICAA adopts the combinatorial auction as the basis, but is not limited to bidding from only one provider. Therefore, ICAA has both the advantages of combinatorial auction and flexibility of MRN. Due to these reasons, the time used in ICAA is shorter than those in both MRN and CA-LP. Figure 4 (c) and Figure 4 (d) present the respective utility distributions when N req are 4 and 6. Before analyzing the results, we should note that an even utility distribution is important to attract agents to participate in the task allocation. From Figure 4 (c), we can see that compared with both MRN and CA-LP, more individual utilities of agents in ICAA fall into the middle-ranges (e.g., [0.4, 0.6) and [0.6, 0.8)). This means that the utility distribution of ICAA is more even than those of both MRN and CA-LP. This is because in CA-LP, a consumer is single-minded, which means that the consumer does not accept any resources if it cannot obtain all of its required resources from the provider. Consequently, the all-or-nothing bidding strategy of the consumer in CA-LP results in more utilities falling into both the high-ranges and low-ranges. It is allowed that only a partial set of the resource types of a bidder are chosen in ICAA. Thus, there are less high-range and low-range utilities in ICAA, compared with CA-LP. In addition, besides the bidding price, the consumer in ICAA takes into account the possible decommitment probability of the bidders as well, while the consumer in MRN does not. Moreover, the separate negotiation of MRN can result in high decommitment probability. Consequently, there are more very low-range utilities in MRN, compared with ICAA. For the same reason, both MRN and CA-LP are more sensitive to the values of N req than ICAA, and this can be observed from Figure  4 (c) and Figure 4 (d) , that is, the utility distribution of ICAA does not change as much as those of both MRN and CA-LP, when N req becomes 6 from 4.
Experimental Results and Analysis of Scenario 2
Figure 5 (a) shows the success rate of task allocation based on different allocation flexibilities (f lex(t)). As can be seen from Figure 5 Compared with the separate negotiations in MRN, the biddings for bundles of resources in ICAA can save the time taken by task allocation. For these reasons, the task allocation in ICAA is faster than those in both CA-LP and MRN. [40, 50) , more individual utilities of agents in all of the three approaches fall into the middle ranges, than that when f lex(t) varies over the range of [30, 40) . This is because when f lex(t) increases, the consumers in MRN have longer time to negotiate, and those in both ICAA and MRN have longer time to look for replacements for the decommitted providers when decommitments happen. As a consequence, a large f lex(t) can decrease the failure probability of task allocation and thus reduces the low-range utilities.
Experimental Results and Analysis of Scenario 3
From Figure 6 (a), when the resource competition (ψ(r)) varies over the range of [0. 2, 4] , ICAA always achieves higher success rates of task allocation than both MRN and CA-LP. In addition, the success rate of ICAA becomes much higher than those of both MRN and CA-LP with the increase of ψ(r). This is because the consumer in CA-LP places all-or-nothing bids for combinations of resources. This is a disadvantage in that it is hard for the consumer to look for the provider which possesses all of the required resource types. In contrast, in ICAA, it is allowed that a partial set of the resource types in a bid are selected by the consumer. The separate negotiation in MRN takes a long time to obtain all of the required resources. This is a disadvantage of MRN due to the time constraints of task allocation. When ψ(r) is low, which means that there are sufficient resources in environment, the above mentioned disadvantages of CA-LP and MRN are not obvious. With the increase of ψ(r), however, such disadvantages become stronger, and consequently hinder the success rate of task allocation more. In addition, providers in ICAA can adjust their bidding prices for a resource according to the competition level (or popularity) of the resource, which can be seen from Equation (3). Such a flexible bidding strategy can prevent the success rate of task allocation from increasing/decreasing too sharply when ψ(r) changes. The above are the reasons why the success rates of both MRN and CA-LP become much lower than that of ICAA with the increase of ψ(r).
As can be seen from Figure 6 (b), the time taken by task allocation in ICAA is always shorter than those in both CA-LP and MRN. The reason for this is the same as that in Figure 5 In addition, we can see that when ψ(r) varies from 0.6 to 2, the utility distributions of all of the three approaches become less even, and such a changing is stronger for both CA-LP and MRN than ICAA. The reason for this is that it gets harder for consumers to obtain all the required resource types when resource competition is higher. Moreover, the disadvantages of both CA-LP and MRN which are mentioned in Figure 6 (a) become stronger with the increase of ψ(r). This further prevents the utility distributions from being even. In contrast, the bidding strategy of providers in ICAA (Equation (3)) can inhibit the changing of utility distributions when ψ(r) increases.
Experimental Results and Analysis of Scenario 4
As can be seen from Figure 7 , ICAA always achieves better performances in terms of success rate, time taken, and utility distribution than both MRN and CA-LP. The reasons for this are the same as those in Scenario 3. In this scenario, we focus on studying the change in performances when the scales of both agents and tasks vary. From Figure 7 , we can see that compared with the performances of both ICAA and MRN, which remain steady, the performance of CA-LP decreases more with the increase of scales. The reason is that in CA-LP, resource providers adopt linear programming to decide the winning bidder (consumer). When there are too many tasks and consumers involved, the linear programming will computationally hinder the performance of task allocation. In ICAA and MRN, however, task allocation is distributed among all the consumers. Consequently, the performances of these two approaches will not be affected as much by the scales of agents and tasks as that of CA-LP.
RELATED WORK
In recent years, many approaches for group task allocation in multi-agent network environments have been proposed. These include negotiation-based approaches, combinatorial auction-based approaches, coalition formation-based ones, and virtual organization-based ones.
The task allocation approach proposed by Goradia et al. addresses the group task allocation problem in multi-agent environments [31] . In both their approach and ICAA, there is no central controller, and agents are self-interested. Their approach focuses on the negotiation strategy of providers, which negotiate with their potential partners in order to form a group to accomplish tasks collaboratively. ICAA addresses the problem of which providers a consumer should choose in order to form a group. Therefore, their approach solves the group task allocation problem from the perspective of providers, while ICAA does so from the perspective In [16] , An et al. proposed a multi-resource negotiation approach to allocate tasks in a market-based environment. In their approach, a consumer negotiates with providers for each of the required resources separately.
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Compared with the combinatorial auction employed in ICAA, the multi-resource negotiation has two disadvantages. First, the separate negotiations always cause an invalid bundle of resources, in that the already obtained bundle of resources become invalid when the follow-up negotiations for other resources fail. Second, the separate negotiations always result in a large number of providers being selected to finish a task, and this may result in communication overload among the selected providers.
Due to its perceived fairness and allocation efficiency, the auction theory has been proved to be a useful and powerful tool for distributed problems (e.g., the resource allocation in grid/cloud environments [32, 33, 34] To handle the problem of dynamism of tasks, Schoenig et al. proposed Squential Single-Item auctions (SSI) [36] to allocate tasks in dynamic environments where not all of the tasks are known at the start of the auction. In their work, different auctioning and winner determination schemes, which include plan modification, re-planning, minimum cost, and regret clearing for winner determination, were used and evaluated. SSI with appropriate auctioning and winner determination schemes can work effectively for task allocation in dynamic environments, under the circumstances where tasks are highly dynamic. Unlike SSI which solves the task allocation focusing on the dynamism of tasks, ICAA solves the task allocation concentrating on the dynamism of resource providers. Therefore, compared with SSI, ICAA is more suitable for task allocations in the environments where providers are highly dynamic.
Besides single-item auction, combinatorial auction is also widely used for task allocations in the grid/cloud environments. For instance, Walsh et al. developed a combinatorial auction-based approach for supply chain formation [7] . Their approach aims at assembling suitable resource providers to form a supply chain to finish the group of subtasks with dependency constraints of a task in task dependency networks. Their approach allows resource providers to quote strategically, and concentrates on the quoting strategies of providers. Their approach is centralized due to the public auctioneer, whereas ICAA is decentralized in that each consumer in ICAA plays the role of the auctioneer for itself, which could improve the privacy management of self-interested agents. Normally, a public auctioneer can cause overloads of both the communication and computation, and suffers from the single point of failure problem. Therefore, it is always undesirable to introduce cental controllers into any system with a goal of high availability or reliability (e.g., business practices, software applications, or other industrial systems) [37] . In addition, in the competitive grid/cloud environments, it is hard for the self-interested bidders to trust the public auctioneer, and it is also hard for the auctioneer to acquire truthful information about the self-interested bidders [17] .
In order to eliminate the central controller in their previous work [7] , Walsh and Wellman further proposed an asynchronous and decentralized market protocol for supply chain formation with resource scarcity [38] . In their protocol, the participants form the supply chain through negotiating in a bottom-up fashion, requiring only local views of the environments. The prices of agents are coordinated by the price system in which the price for each resource is determined through an ascending auction. Walsh and Wellman overcame the centralisation of their work in [7] by auctioning for each of the required resources separately. However, the consequent decentralisation is acquired in compromise of consumers' risking in obtaining a bundle of invalid resources. The reason for this is that when auctioning for each of the required resource separately, the bundle of obtained resources becomes invalid if the subsequent auctions for the complementary resources fail. In ICAA, a consumer acquires all the required resources in a combinatorial auction, and this can decrease the risk of obtaining a bundle of invalid resources.
When the execution of a task needs the collaboration of multiple providers, normally, it is computationally expensive for a consumer to choose the group of winning bidders in combinatorial auctions. Integer programming was adopted by Giovannucci et al. to solve this problem in [39] . However, integer programming faces the problem of scalability. Even though Giovannucci et al. tried to improve the scalability problem caused by integer programming through taking the structural properties of networks into account, the improvement is limited and consequently, the scalability problem still remains an ongoing problem. In ICAA, due to the design of the indicator, the problem of scalability could be significantly mitigated, which was shown in the evaluation results of Scenario 4.
Kraus and Shehory proposed an auction-based coalition formation approach for task allocation in the problem of supply chain formation. In their approach, a coalition is treated as an entity. No member is allowed to leave a coalition once a task is allocated to the coalition. If there is more than one candidate coalition, the auctioneer selects the winner only according to the bids placed by the coalitions. In ICAA, however, both the resource providers and consumers are allowed to come and leave freely. Consequently, besides the bids, a consumer in ICAA also takes the dynamism and openness of the environments into account when choosing providers.
A reinforcement learning-based coalition formation approach for task allocation was proposed by Abdallah and Lesser [40] .
They introduced reinforcement learning into their approach to help consumers choose the most suitable group of providers according to some predefined rules. In their approach, once a provider becomes a member of a group, it is neither allowed to leave the group nor join any other groups simultaneously, even though the provider still has some surplus resources that are required by other tasks. Therefore, their approach results in the waste of resources. In addition, when some more urgent tasks come into the environments, the already-chosen providers are not allowed to be transferred to the more urgent tasks, and this can result in the failures of these tasks.
The work of Mashayekhy and Grosu in [41] addresses the formation of Virtual Organizations (VOs) to finish big applications and tasks.
In their work, resource providers pool their resources together, and automatically form VOs to finish the perceived task or application to gain mutual profits. The group task allocation addressed in this paper is closely related with the VO formation problem. However, strictly speaking, they are not exactly the same, and there are two reasons for this. First, the specific definition of VO defined by Foster, Jennings, and Kesselman is that VO is viewed as a form of dynamic service composition where a number of initially distinct entities come together to form a new entity that offers a new service, under a set of operating conditions. In such cases, the key challenges for the participating agents is to determine who else should be involved in the coalition and what their various roles and responsibilities should be. In addition, the VO formation typically involves negotiation among participants, in this case to determine a mutually acceptable agreement concerning the division of labor and responsibilities [42] . According to this definition, the participants in a VO have some pre-defined roles in regard to which resources it must provide and how the reward should be shared. In addition, the participants can decide which partners to choose. Taking the work in [41] as an example, a resource provider can decides which OV to join, through negotiating with its potential partners. However, in our problem, the responsibility of resource provision and reward sharing is in the control of the consumer, that is, it is the consumer's responsibility to select the resource providers to finish the tasks.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes an indicator-based combinatorial auction-based approach for group task allocation in open and dynamic network environments. Because the required resources of a task are distributed over more than one resource provider, there may be multiple provider combinations, each of which can finish the task. In addition, the environments are open and dynamic, where resource providers can come and leave freely and unpredictably. In such situations, it is a very challenging problem for a consumer to choose the best combination of providers. To address this challenging problem, the proposed approach devises an indicator, through which the consumer can evaluate all the combinations in order to choose the most suitable one. The indicator design, which takes both the openness and dynamism of the environments into consideration, is the main novelty of the proposed approach. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach outperforms two well-known approaches in terms of success rate of task allocation, individual utility distribution of involved agents, the speed of task allocation, and scalability.
In future work, we intend to extend this work to task allocation when a task consists of more than one subtask with multiple constraints, such as resource preference constraint and dependency constraint among subtasks. In addition, in this paper, a resource from one provider is considered comparable as an identical resource to that from another provider in terms of the utility provided by that resource. In reality, however, the utility provided by each resource will depend on the composition of resources selected. Therefore, utility which is related to resource composition will be studied in more detail in our future work.
